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Abstract. Comparing humans and machines is one important source of
information about both machine and human strengths and limitations.
Most of these comparisons and competitions are performed in rather
specific tasks such as calculus, speech recognition, translation, games,
etc. The information conveyed by these experiments is limited, since it
portrays that machines are much better than humans at some domains
and worse at others. In fact, CAPTCHAs exploit this fact. However,
there have only been a few proposals of general intelligence tests in the
last two decades, and, to our knowledge, just a couple of implementations
and evaluations. In this paper, we implement one of the most recent test
proposals, devise an interface for humans and use it to compare the
intelligence of humans and Q-learning, a popular reinforcement learning
algorithm. The results are highly informative in many ways, raising many
questions on the use of a (universal) distribution of environments, on the
role of measuring knowledge acquisition, and other issues, such as speed,
duration of the test, scalability, etc.
Keywords: Intelligence measurement, universal intelligence, general vs.
specific intelligence, reinforcement learning, IQ tests.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that IQ tests are not useful for evaluating the intelligence of
machines. The main reason is not because machines are not able to ‘understand’
the test. The real reason is scarcely known and poorly understood, since available
theories do not manage to fully explain the empirical observations: it has been
shown that relative simple programs can be designed to score well on these tests
[11]. Some other approaches such as the Turing Test [15] and Captchas [17] have
their niches, but they are also inappropriate to evaluate AGI systems.
In the last fifteen years, several alternatives for a general (or universal) intel-
ligence test (or definition) based on Solomonoff’s universal distributions [12] (or
related ideas such as MML, compression or Kolmogorov complexity) have been
appearing on the scene [1, 3, 7, 8, 5], claiming that they are able to define or eval-
uate (machine) intelligence. In this paper we use one of these tests, a prototype
based on the anytime intelligence test presented in [5] and the environment class
introduced in [4], to evaluate one easily accessible biological system (Homo sapi-
ens) and one off-the-shelf AI system, a popular reinforcement algorithm known
as Q-learning [18]. In order to do the comparison we use the same environment
class for both types of systems and we design hopefully non-biased interfaces for
both. We perform a pilot experiment on a reduced group of individuals.
From this experiment we obtain a number of interesting findings and insights.
First, it is possible to do the same test for humans and machines without being
anthropomorphic. The test is exactly the same for both and it is founded on a
theory derived from sound computational concepts. We just adapt the interface
(what way rewards, actions and observations look like) depending on the type of
subjects. Second, humans are not better than Q-learning in this test, even though
the test (despite several simplifications) is based on a universal distribution of
environments over a very general environment class. Third, since these results
are consistent to those in [11] (which show that machines can score well in IQ
tests), this gives additional evidence that a test which is valid for humans or
for machines separately might be useless to distinguish or to place humans and
machines on the same scale, so failing to be a universal intelligence test.
The following section overviews the most important proposals on defining
and measuring machine intelligence to date, and, from them, it describes the
intelligence test and the environment class we will use in this paper. Sections
3 and 4 describe the testing setting, the two types of agents we evaluate (Q-
learning and humans) and their interfaces. Section 5 includes the comparison
of the experimental results, analysing them by several factors. Finally, section 6
examines these results in a deeper way and draws several conclusions about the
way universal intelligence tests should and should not be.
2 Measuring intelligence universally
Measuring machine intelligence or, more generally, performance has been virtu-
ally relegated to a philosophical or, at most, theoretical issue in AI. Given that
state-of-the-art technology in AI is still far from truly intelligent machines, it
seems that the Turing Test [15] (and its many variations [10]) and Captchas
[17] are enough for philosophical debates and practical applications respectively.
There are also tests and competitions in restricted domains, such as competi-
tions in robotics, in game playing, in machine translation and in reinforcement
learning (RL), most notably the RL competition. All of them use a somewhat
arbitrary and frequently anthropomorphic set of tasks.
An alternative, general proposal for intelligence and performance evaluation
is based on the notion of universal distribution [12] and the related algorithmic
information theory (a.k.a. Kolmogorov complexity) [9]. Using this theory, we
can define a universal distribution of tasks for a given AI realm, and sort them
according to their (objective) complexity. There are some early works which
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develop these ideas to construct intelligence tests. First, [1] suggested the in-
troduction of inductive inference problems in a somehow induction-enhanced
or compression-enhanced Turing Test [15]. Second, [3] derived intelligence tests
(C-tests) as sets of sequence prediction problems which were generated by a uni-
versal distribution, and the result (the intelligence of the agent) was a sum of
performances for a range of problems of increasing complexity. The complexity
of each sequence was derived from its Kolmogorov complexity (a Levin variant
was used). This kind of problem (discrete sequence prediction), although typical
in IQ tests, is a narrow AI realm. In fact, [11] showed that relatively simple
algorithms could score well at IQ tests (and, as a consequence, at C-tests). In
[3] the suggestion of using interactive tasks where “rewards and penalties could
be used instead” was made. Later, Legg and Hutter (e.g. [7],[8]) gave a precise
definition to the term “Universal Intelligence”, also grounded in Kolmogorov
complexity and Solomonoff’s prediction theory, as a sum (or weighted average)
of performances in all the possible RL-like environments. However, in order to
make a feasible test by extending from (static) sequences to (dynamic) envi-
ronments, several issues had to be solved first. In [5], they address the problem
of finding a finite sample of environments and sessions, as well as appropriate
approximations to Kolmogorov complexity, the inclusion of time, and the proper
aggregation of rewards. The theory, however, has not been put into practice until
now in the form of a real test, in order to evaluate artificial and biological agents,
and, interestingly, to compare them. In this paper, we use a (simplified) imple-
mentation of this test (non-anytime) [5] using the environment class introduced
in [4] to compare Q-learning with Homo sapiens.
From this comparison we want to answer several questions. Are these tests
general enough? Does the complexity of the exercises correlate with the success
rate of Q-learning and humans? Does the difference correspond to the real dif-
ference in intelligence between these two kinds of agents? What implications do
the results have on the notion of universal intelligence and the tests that attempt
to measure it? Answering all these questions is the goal of this paper.
The choice of a proper environment class is a crucial issue in any intelligence
test. This is what [4] attempts, a hopefully unbiased environment class (called
Λ) with spaces and agents with universal descriptive (Turing-complete) power.
Basically, this environment considers a space as a graph with a different (and
variable) topology of actions. Objects and agents can be introduced using Turing-
complete languages to generate their movements. Rewards are rational numbers
in the interval r1, 1s and are generated by two special agents Good and Evil,
which leave rewards in the cells they visit. Good and Evil have the same pattern
for behaviour except for the sign of the reward (  for Good,  for Evil).
The environment class Λ is shown in [4] to have two relevant properties
for a performance test: (1) their environments are always balanced (a random
agent has expected reward 0), and (2) their environments are reward-sensitive
(there is no sequence of actions such that the agent can be stuck in a heaven or
hell situation, where rewards are positive or negative independently of what the
agent may do). As argued in [5], these two properties are very important for the
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environments to be discriminative and comparable (and hence the results being
properly aggregated into a single score, a performance or intelligence score). No
other properties are imposed, such as (e.g.) environments being Markov processes
or being ergodic. For more details of the environment class Λ, see [4].
3 Test setting and administration
Following the definition of the environment class Λ, we perform some simplifica-
tions to generate each environment. For instance, speed is not considered thus
being a non-anytime version of the test presented in [5]. In addition, we do not
use a Turing-complete algorithm to generate the environments. Spaces are gen-
erated by first determining the number of cells nc, which is given by a number
between 2 and 9, using an geometric / ‘unary’ distribution (i.e. probpnq  2n,
and normalising to sum up to 1). Similarly, the number of actions na is defined
with a uniform distribution between 2 and nc. Both cells and actions are indexed
with natural numbers. There is a special action 0 which connects every cell with
itself (it is always possible to stay at the cell). A cell which is accessible from
another cell using one action is called a ‘neighbouring’ or adjacent cell. The con-
nections between cells are created by using a uniform distribution for each pair
of cell and action, which assigns the destination cell for each pair. We consider
the posibility that some actions may be disabled. Fig. 1 shows an example of a
randomly generated space.






Fig. 1. A space with 5 cells and 3 actions (a0, a1, a2). Reflexive action a0 is not shown.
The number of cells and actions is, of course, related to the complexity of
the space, but not monotonically related to its Kolmogorov complexity (or a
computable variant such as Levin’s Kt). Nonetheless, most of the actual grading
of environments comes from the behaviour of Good and Evil. The sequence
of actions for Good and Evil is defined by using a uniform distribution for
each element in the sequence, and a unary (geometric) distribution to determine
whether to stop the sequence, by using a probability of stopping (pstop). An
example of sequence for the space in Fig. 1 is 201210200, which means the
execution of actions a2, a0, a1, a2, etc. Consider, e.g., that Good is placed at
cell c5. Since the pattern starts with ‘2’, Good will move (via a2) to cell c1. The
agents Good and Evil take one action from the sequence and execute it for each
step. When the actions are exhausted, the sequence is started all over again. If
an action is not allowed at a particular cell, the agent does not move.
Initially, each agent is randomly (using a uniform distribution) placed in a
cell. Then, we let Good, Evil and the evaluated agent interact for a certain
number of steps m. We call this an exercise (or episode). For an exercise we
average the obtained rewards, so giving a score of the agent in the environment.
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A test is a sequence of exercises or episodes. We will use 7 environments,
each with a number of cells (nc) from 3 to 9. The size of the patterns for Good
and Evil will be made proportional (on average) to the number of cells, using
pstop  1{nc. In each environment, we will allow 10pnc1q steps so the agents
have the chance to detect any pattern in the environment (exploration) and also
have some further steps to exploit the findings (in case a pattern is actually
conceived). The limitation of the number of environments and steps is justified
because the tests is meant to be applied to biological agents in a reasonable
period of time (e.g., 20 minutes) and we estimate an average of 4 seconds per
action. Table 1 shows the choices we have made for the test:
Env. # No. cells (nc) No. steps (m) pstop
1 3 20 1{3
2 4 30 1{4
3 5 40 1{5
4 6 50 1{6
5 7 60 1{7
6 8 70 1{8
7 9 80 1{9
TOTAL - 350 -
Table 1. Setting for the 7 environments which compose the test.
Although [4] suggests a partially-observable interface, here we make it fully-
observable, so agents see all the cells, the actions and their contents. The agents
do not know in advance who Good is and who Evil is. They have to guess that.
4 Agents and interfaces
4.1 An AI agent: Q-learning
The choice of Q-learning is, of course, one of many possible choices for a reinforce-
ment learning algorithm. The reason is deliberate because we want a standard
algorithm to be evaluated first, and, most especially, because we do not want to
evaluate (at the moment) very specialised algorithms for ergodic environments
or algorithms with better computational properties (e.g. delayed Q-learning [13]
would be a better option if speed were an issue). We use an off-the-shelf imple-
mentation of Q-learning, as explained in [18] and [14].
We use the description of cell contents as a state. We choose Q-learning’s pa-
rameters as α  0.05 learning rate and γ  0.35 discount factor. The parameters
have been chosen by trying 20 consecutive values for α and γ between 0 and 1.
These 400 combinations have been evaluated for 1,000 sessions each using ran-
dom environments of different size and complexity and episodes of 10,000 steps.
This choice is, of course, beneficial for Q-learning’s performance in the tests.
Since we have rewards between -1 and 1, the elements in the Q matrix are set
to 2.0 initially (rewards are normalised between 0 and 2 to always be positive).
4.2 A biological agent: Homo sapiens
We took 20 humans from a University Department (PhD students, research and
teaching staff) with ages ranging between 20 and 50.
5
Fig. 2. A snapshot of the interface for humans. The agent has just received a positive
reward, shown with the circle with an upwards arrow. The image also shows the agent
located in cell 3, and Evil and Good are placed in cells 2 and 3 respectively. The agent
can move to cell 1 and cell 3. Cell 3 is highlighted since the mouse pointer is over it.
The interface for humans has been designed with the following principles in
mind: i) the signs used to represent observations should not have an implicit
meaning for the subject, to avoid bias in favour of humans (e.g. no skull-and-
bones for the Evil agent), ii) actions and rewards should be easily interpreted
by the subject, to avoid a cognitive overhead that would bias the experiment in
favour of Q-learning. This way, the following design decisions have been made
(Fig. 2 shows a snapshot of the interface). At the beginning of the test, the
subject is presented the task instructions, which strictly contain what the user
should know. The cells are represented by coloured squares. Agents are repre-
sented by symbols that aim to be ‘neutral’ (e.g.,  stands for Evil and  stands
for Good in the third environment, and © represents the subject in every envi-
ronment). Accessible cells have a thicker border than non-accessible ones. When
the subject rolls the mouse pointer over an accessible cell, this cell is highlighted
using a double border and increasing the saturation of the background colour.
Positive, neutral and negative rewards are represented by an upwards arrow in
a green circle, a small square in a grey circle, and a downwards arrow in a red
circle, respectively. The test and its interface for humans can be downloaded
from http://users.dsic.upv.es/proy/anynt/human1/test.html.
5 Results
We performed 20 tests (with 7 exercises each) with the setting shown in Table































Fig. 3. Histograms of the (20  7 ) 140 exercises for Q-learning (left) and humans
(right). Lines show the probability densities.
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The first observation from this paired set of results comes from the means.
While Q-learning has an overall mean of 0.259, humans show a mean of 0.237.
The standard deviations are 0.122 and 0.150 respectively. Figure 3 shows the
histograms and the probability densities (estimated by the R package).
To see the results in more detail in terms of the exercise, Figure 4 (left)
shows the results aggregating by exercise (there is one exercise for each number
of cells between 3 and 9, so totalling 7 exercises per test). This figure shows the
mean, median and dispersion of both Q-learning and humans for each exercise.
Looking at the boxplots for each space size we also see that there is no significant
difference in terms of how Q-learning and humans perform in each of the seven
exercises. While means are around 0.2 and 0.3, variances are smaller the larger
the number of cells is. This is explained because the exercise with higher number
of cells has a higher number of iterations (see Table 1).


















































































































































































Fig. 4. Left: Box (whisker) plots for the seven exercises depending on the agent. Medi-
ans are shown in the box as a short black segment. Means are connected by a continuous
line for Q-learning and a dashed line for humans. Right: the average reward results for
the 20 7 2  280 exercises using Kapprox as a measure of complexity.
We applied two-way repeated measures ANOVA (agent  number of cells).
ANOVA showed no statistically significant effects neither for agent (F1,19  .461,
P  .506), nor for the number of cells (F6,114  .401, P  .877). No statistically
significant interaction effect was found (F6,114  .693, P  .656) either.
Finally, since the size of the space is not a measure of complexity, we explored
the relation with the complexity of the environments. In order to approximate
this complexity, we used the size of the compressed pattern for Good and Evil,
denoted by P . More formally, given an environment µ, we calculate an approxi-
mation to its (Kolmogorov) complexity, denoted by Kapprox as follows:
Kapprox  LZpP qq
For instance, if a pattern is P=“20122220022222200222222002”, we compress the
string (using the memCompress function in R, with a GNU project implemen-
tation of Lempel-Ziv coding). The length of the compressed string is 19.
Figure 4 (right) shows each of the 207  140 exercises for each kind of agent.
Again we see a higher dispersion for humans than for Q-learning (the 20 humans
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are different, while Q-learning is exactly the same algorithm for each of the 20
tests). We calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between complexity and
reward. Now we do find a statistically significant correlation both for humans
(r  .257, n  140, P  .001) and for Q-learning (r  .444, n  140, P  
.001). We also analyse these correlations by number of cells, as shown in Table
2. This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients and associated significance
levels (one tailed test) between “complexity” and “reward” by “numbers of cells”
for each agent. All n  20.
Agent 3 cells 4 cells 5 cells 6 cells 7 cells 8 cells 9 cells
Human -.474 (.017) -.134 (.286) -.367 (.056) -.515 (.010) -.282 (.114) -.189 (.213) -.146 (.270)
Q-learning -.612 (.002) -.538 (.008) -.526 (.009) -.403 (.039) -.442 (.026) -.387 (.046) -.465 (.019)
Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients and p values (in parentheses) between “com-
plexity” and “reward” by “numbers of cells”.
We see that correlations are stronger and always significant for Q-learning,
while they are milder (and not always significant) for humans. This may be
explained because humans are not reset between exercises. In general, we would
need more data (more tests) to confirm or refute this hypothesis.
6 Discussion
In section 2 we outlined several questions. One question is whether the test is
general enough. It is true that we have made many simplifications to the environ-
ment class, in such a way that Good and Evil do not react to the environment
(they just execute a cyclical sequence of actions as a pattern), and we have used
a very simple approximation to complexity instead of better approximations to
Kolmogorov complexity or Levin’s Kt. In addition, and the parameters for Q-
learning have been chosen to be optimal for these kinds of spaces and patterns.
Besides, humans are not (cannot be) reset between exercises. Despite all these
issues (most of) which are in favour of Q-learning, we think (although this can-
not be concluded in an absolute way) that the tests are not general enough.
Q-learning is not the best AI algorithm available nowadays (in fact we do not
consider Q-learning very intelligent). So, the results are not representing the real
difference in intelligence between humans and Q-learning.
A possibility is that our sample size is perhaps too small. Having more envi-
ronments of higher complexity and letting the agents interact longer with each
of them may perhaps portray a different picture. Nonetheless, it is not clear
that humans can scale up well in this kind of exercise, especially if no part of
previous exercises can be reused to other exercises. First, some of the patterns
which appeared in the most complex exercises were considered very difficult by
humans. Second, Q-learning requires many interactions to converge, so perhaps
this would only exaggerate the difference in favour of Q-learning. In any case,
this should be properly analysed with further experiments.
A more fundamental issue is whether we are testing on the wrong sort of
environments. The environment class is a general class which includes two sym-
metrical agents, Good and Evil, which are in charge of rewards. We do not think
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that this environment class is, in any case, biased against humans (the contrary
can be argued, though). In the end, the question of whether a test is biased
is difficult to answer, since any single choice implies a certain bias. So, in our
opinion, the problem might be found in the environment distribution. Choosing
the universal distribution gives high probability to very simple examples with
very simple patterns, but more importantly, makes any kind of rich interaction
impossible even in environments of high Kolmogorov complexity. So, a better
environment distribution (and perhaps class) should give more probability to
incremental knowledge acquisition, social capabilities and more reactivity.
This goal towards more knowledge-intensive tasks has the risk of focussing
on knowledge and language, or to embark on Ttests without any theoretical
background, such as Jeopardy-like contests. The generality of these tasks may
be high, although the adaptability and the required learning abilities might be
low. This is something recurrent in psychometrics, where it is important (but
difficult) to distinguish between knowledge acquisition capabilities and knowl-
edge application. And it is also a challenge for RL-like evaluations and systems,
where knowledge acquisition usually starts from scratch and is not incremental.
So, one of the things that we have learnt is that the change of universal
distributions from passive environments (as originally proposed in [1] and [3]) to
interactive environments (as also suggested in [3] and fully developed in [7, 8]) is
in the right direction, but it is not the solution yet. It is clear that it allows for
a more natural interpretation of the notion of intelligence as performance in a
wide range of environments, and it eases the application of tests outside humans
and machines (children, apes, etc.), but there are some other issues we have
to address to give an appropriate definition of intelligence and a practical test.
The proposal for an adaptive test [5] introduces many new ideas about creating
practical intelligence tests, and the universal distribution is substituted by an
adaptive distribution, so allowing a faster convergence to complexity levels which
are more appropriate for the agent. Nonetheless, we think that the priority is
in defining new environment distributions which can give higher probability to
environments where intelligence can show its full potential (see, e.g. [6]).
Summing up, while there has been some work on comparing humans and
machines on some specific tasks, e.g., humans and Q-learning in [2], this paper
may start a series of experimental research comparing several artificial agents
(such as other algorithms in reinforcement learning, MonteCarlo AIXI [16], etc.)
and other biological agents (children, other apes, etc) for general tasks. This
might be a highly valuable source of information about whether the concept of
universal intelligence evaluation works, by trying to construct more and more
general (and universal) intelligence tests. This could lead eventually to a new
discipline, for which we already suggest a name: “universal psychometrics”.
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